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Purpose – The aim of this paper is to show how the choice and ongoing evaluation of a firm’s business 
model, as a matter of strategic guidance, are key aspects of corporate governance, with particular 
reference to risk management in Islamic banks.  
Design/methodology/approach – This research uses a case study approach, with a single case which 
was chosen as it fits very well the purpose of this research. The data collection was based largely on 
documentary evidence. Company data was collected from company annual reports, press releases, and 
legitimate web sites. The ORBIS Bank Focus database was also used to produce a comparative financial 
analysis. 
Findings – The study findings illustrate how an apparently successful business model may fail due to 
an inherent instability that could have been identified through the application of careful risk analysis 
(including stress testing) in the choice and ongoing evaluation of the business model, which robust 
corporate governance and strategic guidance require. In particular, Arcapita’s problems illustrate the 
dangers to Islamic financial institutions from business models that involve undue exposure to liquidity 
risk. 
Practical implications – The issues raised in the paper are important in that Islamic banking and 
finance is an integral part of the global banking and finance industry. Investors and regulators are now 
requesting corporate management to provide improved service to shareholders and other stakeholders 
alike.  Islamic financial institutions rely on the confidence of investors and market participants, just like 
conventional institutions, and when this confidence erodes, it may prove difficult to regain. 
Social implications – The global credit crisis of 2008 caused significant difficulties to firms, especially 
financial institutions, even with substantial government intervention in the economy, which raised some 
issues of corporate governance and ethics.   
Originality/value – This paper extends the knowledge of the potential effects of weaknesses in 
corporate governance and risk management, with specific reference to strategic guidance in the choice 
and ongoing evaluation of a firm’s business model, especially in relation to the Islamic banking sector. 
It also provides a telling illustration of the need for the enhancements of the Basel Committee’s 
prudential requirements set out in the various Basel III documents.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Strategic Guidance, Islamic banks, Risk Management, Arcapita 
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1. Introduction 
The global credit crisis of 2008 caused major frustration to firms, even with significant government 
intervention in the economy, which raised some issues of corporate governance (CG) and ethics.  People 
and governments around the world are demanding that corporate management provide improved service 
to shareholders and other stakeholders alike.  Islamic financial institutions (IFI) rely on the confidence 
of investors and market participants, just like conventional institutions, and when this confidence 
erodes, it may prove challenging to regain.  Financial success is based on different elements, such as 
opportunity, management strategy and trust. 
This paper aims to examine the relationships between CG, risk management (RM), strategic guidance 
and the choice of a business model, in the context of Islamic banking where the constraints of 
compliance with the Shari’ah raise specific issues. CG was defined by the OECD (1999) as “a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
[CG] also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined….”. Subsequently, an alternative 
definition was proposed (OECD, 2004), as “procedures and processes according to which an 
organisation is directed and controlled. The CG structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making.” 
With respect to the responsibilities of the Board of Directors (BOD), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles (OECD, 2015, OECD, 2004) state that “The 
corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders”. A key aspect of the strategic guidance is the choice of a business model and the ongoing 
evaluation of the adequacy of that model, taking into account the exposure to risk and risk appetite of 
key stakeholders, and the requirements of effective RM. It is this aspect which is the focus of this paper. 
The context of Shari’ah compliance presents particular issues with respect to RM, precisely that of 
liquidity risk, and to the potential role of Shari’ah governance due to the presence of a specific organ of 
governance, namely a Shari’ah Board with responsibility for monitoring the company’s compliance 
with applicable Shari’ah rules and principles. As argued by AlAbbad et al. (2019), a Shari’ah board at 
the institution level constitutes an important feature to differentiate IB governance from that of 
conventional institutions. 
Arcapita IB is used as a single case study in order to examine the relationships between CG, strategic 
guidance, RM and the choice of a business model. Arcapita’s business model, as an Islamic investment 
bank, is of particular interest as it highlights the relationship between RM and strategic guidance in the 
choice of a business model which involved significant exposure to liquidity risk, and on paper Arcapita 
appeared to have a robust system of RM (as described in Section 4 below). According to Arcapita’s 
annual reports, Arcapita attempts to achieve sustainable growth through maintaining a sturdy capital 
base and fit RM processes. For example, Arcapita embraces an enterprise-wide approach to RM, with 
practical identification and mitigation of the risks embedded in the company’s balance sheet and 
business activities. The main objective of RM is to be consistent with the maximisation of investor 
returns. At the same time, RM aims to maintain the bank’s risk exposure within self-imposed parameters 
defined within the Board’s approved risk policy documents. The overall responsibility for the 
implementation of a sound RM framework lies with firm’s top management and the BOD, through 
establishing an independent RM team. For example, in Arcapita’s case, the bank has established a RM 
Department that works in coordination with the RM Committee, which is a management level 
committee to provide a platform for senior management input, review and approval of critical aspects 
relating to RM. However, this did not prevent it from being forced to apply for protection under Chapter 
11 of the US Bankruptcy Act (see Subsection 4.4 below). As stated in the OECD/G20 Principles of 
Corporate Governance (OECD, 2015) “An area of increasing importance for boards and which is 
closely related to corporate strategy is oversight of the company’s risk management. This risk 
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management oversight will involve oversight of the accountabilities and responsibilities for managing 
risks, specifying the types and degree of risk that a company is prepared to accept in pursuit of its goals, 
and how it will manage the risks that it creates through its operations and relationships.”  It is noteworthy 
that no such emphasis on RM appeared in the section on board responsibilities (pp.24-25) of the 
OECD’s earlier 2005 version of its Principles of CG. This change may reflect an increased awareness 
of the importance of RM in general, and liquidity risk in particular, following the 2007-8 financial crisis  
It is not our purpose to criticise the Board or the management of Arcapita; it is indeed easy to be wise 
after the event.  Rather, we believe that the case of Arcapita provides an excellent illustration of how 
the financial crisis of 2007-8, of which Arcapita was a victim, showed up the lacunae in the Basel II 
Accords and the need for the subsequent provisions of Basel III with respect not just to liquidity RM 
but also to stress testing. A similar observation may be made regarding the revision of the section on 
board responsibilities in the OECD Principles of CG. 
With respect to our use of a single case study, we are not aiming to test a theory but rather to provide a 
micro-level illustration of a historical process, namely the shock of the 2007-8 financial crisis, the need 
for the development of thinking on CG and RM stimulated by that shock, and the response to that need 
in Basel III and the revision of the OECD Principles of CG This illustration provides answers to “how 
and why” questions regarding that historical process of the financial crisis. As Yin (2018) notes the 
need to use case studies arises whenever “an empirical method that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident.”  Given the time that has passed since 
the events covered in the case study, we have relied on documentary sources of information and did not 
conduct interviews with members of Arcapita’s Board or Senior Management.  
According to the research background above, this research seeks to discuss the CG framework, the need 
for strategic guidance by the board and ongoing appraisal of the firm’s business model in the light of 
the risk exposures and risk appetite of key stakeholders, not only shareholders. Strategic guidance 
regarding the choice and ongoing evaluation of the firm’s business model is thus a key issue for CG. 
The context of Shari’ah compliance presents particular issues concerning RM, specifically that of 
liquidity risk (because of certain Shari’ah restrictions), and the potential role of Shari’ah governance 
due to the presence of a particular organ of governance, namely a Shari’ah Board with responsibility 
for monitoring the company’s compliance with applicable Shari’ah rules and principles. For example, 
the Shari’ah board can create pressures on the BOD and management by restricting risky investments 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
2. Review of Theoretical Considerations 
2.1 Risks faced by Islamic Banks 
IFIs, like other financial institutions, are not immune to failure (DeLorenzo, 2000). For example, Ali 
(2007) highlighted that a number of IBs in practice have experienced financial distress which forced 
them to close their operations, such as the case of Ihlas Finans in Turkey. Thus, it has been shown that, 
while the global financial crisis negatively impacted conventional banks, it also adversely affected the 
performance of Islamic banks (Zarrouk, 2012). Importantly, Zarrouk (2012) indicated how weaknesses 
in RM practices in some Islamic banks, alongside a weak regulatory framework, contributed to the 
decline in their performance during the period.  
Unlike conventional institutions, IFIs have as their raison d’être compliance with the Shari’ah (Islamic 
law), which imposes various prohibitions, including riba, i.e. the use of interest-based transactions 
central to conventional banking. Shari’ah-compliant banking thus prohibits interest, which is deemed 
unethical according to the Shari’ah, being considered a ‘pure rent on money’ which allows the financier 
to receive a return without undertaking either risk (apart from credit risk) or effort. Where the wealthy 
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lend to the poor at high rates of interest, poverty is aggravated, which can cause severe financial distress 
and social problems.1 As an alternative, Islamic-compliant banking allows credit or financing to be 
provided by various means which do not involve interest, such as through sales on credit with a profit 
mark-up (provided the goods are not considered prohibited, such as pork or alcohol). The religious 
nature of IBF has led to conjecture that Islamic banks (IBs) possess inherent attributes that enhance 
their ability to withstand economic shocks (Pappas et al., 2017, Hasan and Dridi, 2011). However, 
individual banks are typically subject to different kinds of risks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, 
market risk, interest rate risk, and operational risk.  On the other hand, IBs face rate-of-return risk rather 
than interest rate risk, plus another specific kind of risk, such as Shari’ah non-compliance risk (a type 
of operational risk) and fiduciary risks in respect of profit-sharing investment accounts. IBs also deal 
with traditional risks (such as liquidity) differently compared to conventional banks.  Even though there 
are two types of liquidity risk (market and funding), IBs are subject to an additional element in liquidity 
risks, due to the existence of Shari’ah constraints on the types of high-quality liquid instruments that 
they may hold, especially the lack of short-term sovereign instruments utilised in conventional sectors 
(Archer et al., 2010, Archer, 2011). This restricts market liquidity and forces IBs to hold cash, which 
yields no return. Regarding funding liquidity, in most jurisdictions, IBs lack both a Shari’ah-compliant 
interbank market and a Shari’ah-compliant lender of last resort (LOLR) facility. 
The banking system by its nature is highly sensitive to the management and control of risks.  For 
example, Čihák and Hesse (2010) found that small IBs tend to be more financially stronger than a larger 
one, as IBs tend to loosen their credit risk monitoring system as they become bigger. IBs are also 
exposed to credit risk through clients who default via Murabahah, Salam or Istinsna’a (forms of working 
capital financing), Musharakah or Mudarabah (forms of partnership-based financing) or other financing 
contracts (Archer and Karim, 2013). Credit risk in respect of Ijarah (leasing) is mitigated by the 
financier’s ownership of the leased asset. On the other hand, liquidity risk can be caused by market 
disruptions, which may impact certain sources of funding. Liquidity risk is crucial to Islamic banking 
owing to the exposure to risk being aggravated by Shari’ah constraints. One form of funding liquidity 
risk is refinancing or roll-over risk, i.e. the risk of not being able to refinance liabilities when they fall 
due. This risk is particularly relevant in the case study analysed in this paper.  
2.2 Corporate Governance Practice 
In order to achieve the objectives of Al-Shari’ah, good CG practices are needed to ensure the 
sustainability of IBs, which then leads to promote people’s well-being (Asutay, 2012). For example, 
applying good CG will lead to safeguarding the stakeholders’ interests and facilitates effective 
monitoring to utilise an IBs resources efficiently; as a result, the preservation of wealth is more likely 
to be achieved (Ginena and Hamid, 2015). Therefore, CG and RM are critical to the success of any 
firm, and weakness in these will prove problematic for companies, as Bhagat and Bolton (2008) pointed 
out in their examination of the relationship between CG and firm performance. For macro-level risk, as 
Platonova et al. (2018) stated, the stability of the financial system can be negatively affected by poor 
CG. Furthermore, inadequate RM or the lack thereof can be financially catastrophic not just for 
companies, their employees, their suppliers and customers, but for the whole economy, as evidenced 
by the infamous 2007 subprime mortgage meltdown that contributed to the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis. 
Even though according to some views, CG practice in the context of commercial entities is considered 
to be a product of the western capitalist system (Ertuna and Ertuna, 2016, Aras, 2009: 164, Nakpodia 
et al., 2018), yet  CG applies to non-commercial corporate bodies, such as universities and may well be 
older than the western capitalist system.  As such, it is variously described as, for example, “the system 
of laws, rules, and factors that control operations in a company” (Gillan and Starks, 1998: 10, 
Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003) or “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
 
1 While this type of exploitation might be thought of as a problem of developing economies, recent scandals 
involving so-called ‘payday lenders’ in the UK show that it can also occur in developed economies. 
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board, its shareholders and its other stakeholders” (OECD, 2015). However, CG in Islam differs from 
the conventional side, in that Islamic institutions have a structure of Shari’ah governance and must obey 
the Shari’ah law as well as meeting other requirements (Nomran and Haron, 2020). According to 
Mergaliyev et al. (2019), IFI is considered to be a value-oriented financial institution that is affected by 
the ethical norms, morals, and principles of Islam. 
CG may be considered from the theoretical standpoints of Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and Transactions Costs Theory (Williamson, 1996). From an Agency Theory (AT) perspective, CG 
aims to ensure the accountability of specific individuals within a corporation, using mechanisms that 
can mitigate or prevent the principal-agent problem, which involves resolving the issues that exist in 
the agency relationships between stakeholders in a corporation (principals) on one hand and those 
managing the corporation (agents) on the other hand. Where the corporation is a business firm with 
shareholders, in Jensen and Meckling’s formulation of AT the latter are the principals, and the firm’s 
executives are the agents. AT applies to relations between the principals and the agents involving 
conflicts of interests, where there is asymmetry of information and misalignment of incentives between 
the agents (who are better informed about the firm’s day to day activities) and the principals. Such a 
situation arises, in particular, when the agents and principals have different attitudes towards risk. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory of the ownership structure of the firm, where they 
highlighted the concept of agency costs and the relationship to separation and control.  This issue may 
affect the value of the firm. Thus, the principal engages the agent to perform services on his/her behalf 
that typically involve decision-making to maximise the value of the firm in the principal’s interest. 
However, the agent might have a different strategy and may not maximise value for the principal but 
might instead focus more on optimising his/her own personal welfare, for example through taking 
perquisites or non-pecuniary benefits. This situation creates agency costs, such as the costs of 
monitoring, a form of transactions cost or a reduction in the value of the firm (Williamson, 1996).  
Thus, the principal may reduce the effects of such a conflict of interests through imposing monitoring 
by having a BOD that acts on the principal’s behalf to monitor and control the agent’s activities. On the 
other hand, the principal may also develop appropriate incentives for the agent by contracting the agent 
to undertake actions in the interest of the principal or to avoid specific activities that conflict with the 
principal’s interests. Also, Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that the agency problem is a consequence of 
not conducting a costlessly and enforceable contract. However, these problems could be reduced by 
developing a controlling or monitoring process (carried out by a Board of Directors) that ensures that 
the decisions taken by the agents are in the best interests of the principal.  Williamson (1996) points out 
that this monitoring process (the governance mechanism of equity) is relatively costly.  
Part of this controlling process (to be conducted by the board) is concerned with the effectiveness of 
the performed by the agents, i.e. senior management.  in this context is defined as the process of 
identifying potential risks, analysing the identified risks, evaluating or ranking them in terms of 
seriousness, taking precautionary measures aimed at avoiding or mitigating the risks, and monitoring 
and reviewing the management of the risks (Merna and Al-Thani, 2011, Srinivas, 2019): As well as 
micro-level risks such as credit, market, liquidity and operational risk, these risks include macro-level 
elements associated with economic cycles, including inflation, capital market volatility, commodity 
price volatility, recession, and so on. Thus, with respect to micro-level risk, for example, the 
management a company would conduct due diligence regarding a supplier before engaging the latter or 
perform a credit check on a prospective customer before granting a credit facility.  
Consequently, the focus of this paper is on the situation that ended in Arcapita filing for bankruptcy 
protection, which requires an examination of the CG and RM issues arising from this case study. A key 
question would be: to what extent are failures in RM the result of inadequate CG?   
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3. Methodology 
This research is an exploratory study, focusing on CG and RM. A critical aspect of the strategic 
guidance in CG is the choice of a business model and the evaluation of the adequacy of that model from 
the standpoint of risk appetite and RM. We use a case study as an exploratory method, where a case 
study approach is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with more 
intensity, as highlighted by Yin (2018). A case study approach involves in-depth and detailed 
investigation that can be suitable for explaining a specific problem by using ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
to examine a subject. The examination can be conducted in the form of qualitative or quantitative 
research. Additionally, it allows a researcher to explore the main topics which would not easily be 
covered by a different method.  There are different types of case study designs; however, this research 
uses an embedded case study design, including quantitative analyses, to illustrate and analyse the issues 
of CG and RM.  
The study focuses on the first Islamic investment bank known as “Arcapita”. It used as a single case 
study to illustrate and analyse the relationships between CG, strategic guidance, RM, and the choice 
and ongoing evaluation of a business model. In particular, the case study highlights the relationship 
between RM and strategic guidance in the choice and operation of a business model which involved 
significant exposure to both market and funding liquidity risk. Thus, while Arcapita appeared to have a 
well-developed system of RM, this failed to prevent them from having to file for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Act. 
4. The case of Arcapita 
4.1 Background 
Founded in 1996, and formerly known as the First Islamic Bank, Arcapita is based in Manama, Bahrain. 
It also maintains offices in London, Atlanta, and Singapore. The bank is licensed by the Central Bank 
of Bahrain (CBB), which is the financial and monetary regulator. Bahrain, together with the other Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, holds about 70% of Islamic banking assets (Alhammadi et al., 
2018). The name and logo of the company, along with those of its subsidiaries, was changed to Arcapita 
in 2005 (Mostafa Khan and Jamal Uddin, 2013).  Together with its subsidiaries, the bank is wholly 
owned by Arcapita Group Holdings Limited (AGHL) which operates under the laws of the Cayman 
Islands (Arcapita, 2017). Under contractual arrangements, AGHL and Arcapita Bahrain currently are 
owned by the same shareholders applying the same shareholding ratios entitling them to appoint 
identical members to the BOD in both entities. Arcapita offers investors diversified alternative Shari’ah-
compliant investments in private equity and real estate with long-term returns that claim to exceed those 
of conventional equity markets (Bank Focus, 2019, Karry and Sharif, 2012, Atlanta Business Chronicle, 
2005). Arcapita co-invests with investors in its sponsored investment products and provides investment 
management and administration services (Arcapita, 2017: 11). The company’s key milestones from 
inception to date are stated below in Table 1 to avoid a lengthy historical account:  
Table 1: Key Milestones from Inception to Date 
Year Activities 
1996 Established in December 
1997 Commenced business after raising $100 million in equity capital from the GCC and Southeast Asia 
investors 
1998 First investment in a US-based private equity deal: Perception Group, Inc., a manufacturer of canoes 
and kayaks; Opens its Atlanta office in the US. 
1999 Launches asset management operations 
2000 First real estate investment: First Multifamily Properties LLC, a portfolio of properties in the US 
multifamily real estate sector 
2004 Opens a London office 
2005 The name and logo of the company and those of its subsidiaries were changed to Arcapita 
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2007 Opens a Singapore office 
2010 Arcapita Bahrain moves to its new location in Bahrain Bay, where Arcapita Headquarters are based 
2012 Files for Chapter 11 protection in the US. 
2013 Emerges from Chapter 11 protection 
2014 Raises new equity capital of $100 million 
2015 Acquires its first real estate investment since restructuring in the GCC 
2017 Acquires its first private equity investment since restructuring in the GCC 
Source: Author using Arcapita’s website: https://www.arcapita.com/, and annual report. 
 
4.2 Organisational Structure and Corporate Governance 
Arcapita’s BOD is responsible for the firm’s overall strategy, oversight, and monitoring. It supervises 
senior management who engage in day-to-day management. The BOD is assisted by the three Board 
Committees: Executive Investment Committee (EIC), Executive Administration and Corporate 
Governance Committee (EAC), and Audit and Risk Management Committee (ARC).  
According to Arcapita’s annual report (2011), sound CG is fundamental to the success of the 
organisation. In addition, it is stated that the structure of the CG system at Arcapita complies with 
Shari’ah principles throughout the bank’s business operations. It is worth mentioning that the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) was not mentioned initially as being a component of CG, although it existed. 
Moreover, in 2011 Arcapita implemented a CG code to comply with Bahrain Central Bank guidelines. 
However, this did not protect the bank from the problems that led to it filing for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code in 2012. 
With regard to Shari’ah governance, we may note that Arcapita states that it complies with Shari’ah 
rules and principles following the standards of the Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), and it is overseen by an external and independent Shari’ah Board that is 
supported by its internal Shari’ah department. However, the Shari’ah Board implicitly approved a 
leveraged business model, with leverage being provided through Murabahah facilities.   
Thus, Arcapita’s CG and RM systems, notwithstanding their apparent merits, proved inadequate to 
prevent the bank from incurring the financial distress which led to its filing for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11, as it was unable to withstand the challenge posed by the global crisis of 2007-8. This 
can be attributed to the vulnerability of the bank’s business model to both market and funding liquidity 
risk.  
4.3 Arcapita’s Business Model 
4.3.1 Investment Process  
The investment process at Arcapita involves a six-stage investment decision-making process. It starts 
with deal sourcing secured by Arcapita’s professionals, including private equity, real estate and 
infrastructure. Venture capital professionals are sought through their networks. Due diligence is the 
second stage of the investment process whereby the proposed investment is assessed to determine, 
among other things, compliance with Islamic law and ethics, alignment with the preference and needs 
of the investors; and the expected returns on investment. The help of consultants, financial and 
management experts, as well as legal teams, is required to undertake in-depth due diligence. The third 
stage involves deal closure/underwriting. Here, if Arcapita decides to pursue investments by funding 
the purchase via its balance sheet, Arcapita self-funds the investment. For example, Arcapita initially 
owns 100% of the investment and then sells most of the investment on to clients as described later (for 
more information, see Arcapita annual report 2017). The fundraising or investment placement phase 
(fourth stage) involves Arcapita presenting the investment opportunity to a select clientele and inviting 
them to invest. At the conclusion of the fundraising stage, the investment (or most of it) is placed with 
investors (private equity or venture capital) for a holding period of 3-5 years. The fifth stage (post-
acquisition) is a holding phase that requires Arcapita’s portfolio management team to start monitoring 
the investment’s performance aimed at ensuring eventual investment realisation. The team manages the 
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investment and its operations. In the exit stage (last phase) by securing a sale, recapitalisation or public 
offering. An early exit is possible if an attractive opportunity emerges, while an eventual exit may be 
prolonged to improve its investor’s value. Thus, Arcapita “follows a clearly defined investment process 
for its acquisitions and exits” (Mostafa Khan and Jamal Uddin, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: Arcapita’s Investment Process 
 
Source: Authors’ own figure based on Arcapita, Annual Report 2017: 14. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2 above, Arcapita’s business model, developed and refined over time, commences 
with project sourcing and ends with project divestment. It is primarily focused on using the bank’s 
balance sheet in the first instance to fund deals in private equity, infrastructure, venture capital, and the 
real estate sectors, which are then syndicated out to investors that include high net worth individuals 
with investable assets over USD 1 million, family offices, institutions, and sovereign wealth funds. For 
instance, Arcapita acquires controlling interests in companies with large growth potential with the 
intention to divest at a profit. For example, a going concern bought for US$1 million is nurtured for 3-
5 years assisted by Arcapita’s investment and management team and then sold to investors via a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) for US$ 1.2 million, thereby, making a small premium on the deal, plus fees.  
Arcapita’s business model is summed up by El-Hage and Pierson (2009: 1) as follows: “Arcapita’s 
business model had been developed to provide several revenue-generation opportunities for the bank as 
it conducted its business: acquisition fees levied on each new investment; placement fees charged as 
new investments were placed with investors; asset management fees charged during the holding period; 
performance fees payable upon exiting a transaction, which would be triggered at certain agreed 
performance thresholds; and proprietary investment gains through the bank’s investments alongside its 
investors. This business model required ready liquidity to allow the bank to underwrite transactions, 
to take full advantage of its balance sheet, to support portfolio companies with their ongoing capital 
requirements, and to cover the bank’s operating expenses through the investment cycle” (emphasis 
added). In particular, the model required markets to be receptive to the sale or IPO of the investments 
at the end of a holding period normally not exceeding 5 years, and, insofar as the investments were 
financed by borrowed funds (such as Murabahah financing), that any resulting liquidity risk be 
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4.3.2 Capital Structure 
Mostafa Khan and Jamal Uddin (2013) state that Arcapita, a relatively young Shari’ah-compliant 
financial institution, has become internationally successful by raising funds from the Middle East and 
then investing in the US, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. For the financial year 2019 (twelve-month 
period ending June 30 2019) Arcapita reported revenue of US$ 54.6 million, net income of US$ 21.9 
million and total equity of US$ 237.9 million. It held a paid-up capital of 7.6% in dividend, retained 
earnings worth US$ 41.6 million and US$ 7.46 million in proposed dividends (Arcapita, 2019). Table 
2 below shows the key financial highlights for Arcapita in the financial years 2014 – 2019, post the 
bankruptcy.  
Table 2: Key Financial Highlights for 2014 – 2019 
Key Financial Indicators/Year 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 
Total Revenue  54.6 37.9 33.5 36.2 35.5 29.3 
Net Income 21.9 12.4 8.1 12.2 11.4 10.1 
Total Assets 291.1 340.3 198.7 144.5 144.5 59.1 
Total Liabilities 66 134 65 13 57 10 
Total Equity 237.9 219.7 132.3 130.2 86.1 50.5 
Net Income Margin (percentage) 40 33 24 34 32 35 
Dividend 7.6 7.1 7 7 7 5 
Return on Assets (percentage) 7.5 3.6 4.2 8.5 8.3 17.6 
Return of Equity (percentage) 9.7 6 6.5 9.5 13.3 21.4 
Debt to Equity ratio 29.4 64.5 52.5 10.3 66 21.6 
Equity Multiplier 129 165 153 111 160 122 
Source: Arcapita, Annual Report (in US$ Millions). Also, authors calculation from Arcapita annual reports, 
ROE = net income/total equity, ROA = Net Income/ total assets, Debt to Equity ratio = total Liabilities/Total 
equity, Equity Multiplier = Total Assets/total Equity. Dividend as a percentage of paid-up Capital (percentage). 
The numbers here suggest that Arcapita had changed its business model to be less risky because less reliant on 
borrowings compared to the period prior to the bankruptcy. 
 
Arcapita’s “international success” is not new to analysts as the bank previously recorded growth and 
profitability prior to filing for bankruptcy protection in 2012 (as highlighted in Table 1). Preceding its 
bankruptcy restructuring, the bank had completed 74 transactions worth $28.1 billion across its four 
lines of business – private equity, real estate, infrastructure, and venture capital. The bank had created 
investor returns and a net income at a cumulative 40% annual growth rate (Arcapita, 2008) and had a 
balance sheet total of US$3.7 billion and an equity capital base of US$1.1 billion (Arcapita, 2011). 
However, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 together with the Eurozone crisis had a negative 
impact on Arcapita’s financial performance, with losses in 2009 and 2010 amounting to $87.9 million 
and $559.4 million, respectively (see Table 3 below). As reported in the Financial Times, the bank lost 
its Standard & Poor's (S&P) rating affirming S&P’s negative outlook (Lidstone, 2009). Table 3 shows 
that the leverage ratio was 2.6/3.7 or just over 70%, and a debt/equity ratio of 2.36 or 236%, which was 
much higher than later, as shown in Table 2. Thus, Arcapita has a high degree of leverage before the 
chapter 11 filing. The numbers in Table 3 suggest that Arcapita had a risky business model because 
more reliant on borrowings. 
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Table 3: Key Financial Highlights for 2007 – 2011 
Key Financial Indicators 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007* 
Total Revenue 398 -235 424 624 286 
Net Income (loss) 50.2 -559.4 -87.9 362.5 190.5 
Total Assets 3718.2 3457.1 4372.3 5137.4 3805.5 
Total Liabilities 2601.0 2397.0 2774.0 3708.0 2738.0 
Total Equity 1118.0 1060.0 1599.0 1340.0 955.0 
Net Income Margin (%) 12.6 -682.0 -26.0 58.0 51.0 
Operating Income 211.3 88.3 338.5 618.4 373.4 
Dividend (%) Nil Nil Nil 40.0 50.0 
ROE (%) 4.5 -52.8 -5.5 27.0 19.9 
ROA (%) 1.3 -16.2 -2.0 7.1 5.0 
Debt to Equity ratio (%) 232.7 226.1 173.5 276.8 286.7 
Equity Multiplier (%) 333.0 326.0 274.0 384.0 398.0 
*Note 1: Financial Year (FY) 2007 was a transitional 18-month period. Source: Arcapita, Annual Report (in 
US$ Millions). Also, authors calculation from Arcapita annual reports, ROE = net income/total equity, ROA = 
Net Income/ total assets, Debt to Equity ratio = total Liabilities/Total equity, Equity Multiplier = Total 
Assets/total Equity. Dividend as a percentage of paid-up Capital (percentage). 
 
According to Arcapita, its ownership structure aligns interests between Arcapita and its shareholders, 
which gives Arcapita the flexibility and independence to conduct its business strategies, and Arcapita 
stated that its shareholder base is well diversified, with no one shareholder having a majority stake. 
However, a report by the Financial Times, stated that the CBB granted Arcapita a $250m Murabahah 
facility, “in line with the policy of directing deposits to local banks. This makes the CBB the biggest 
stakeholder (Kerr and Hall, 2012). 
It is noteworthy that following its emergence from chapter. 11, Arcapita modified its business model to reduce 
reliance on leverage. Debt/equity ratios of 200% or more were replaced by debt/equity ratios of between 21.6% 
and 64.5%, with the ratio for 2019 being a modest 29.4%. The fact that a much less leveraged business model 
was found to be viable following emergence from ch.11 raises the question of why such a highly leveraged 
model was adopted initially. This points to a lack of strategic guidance at this earlier stage.   
 
 
4.3.3 Management failures 
Arcapita’s organisational structure appears from the above to provide for sound CG. The three board 
committees, EIC, EAC and ARC, together with the SSB, should between them prevent Arcapita from 
incurring excessive risk exposures. However, this does not seem to have been the case. It was noted in 
Subsection 4.3.1 above that Arcapita’s business model requires ready liquidity. What appears to have 
been lacking, therefore, is strategic guidance (or perhaps strategic awareness) with respect to this 
riskiness of Arcapita’s business model, namely its exposure to both market and funding liquidity risk 
together with its use of leverage to enhance returns to equity. But such lack of awareness was far from 
unusual until the shock of the financial crisis of 2007-8, which led to the reinforcement of the Basel 
Committee’s prudential requirements in Basel III. Hence, to roll-over financing a possible solution that 
Arcapita would use was Murabahah-based funding. But in the credit crunch following the 2007-8 
financial crisis, it became impossible to refinance the US$1.1bn syndicated Murabahah financing.  
4.4 Liquidity Risk Crisis, Bankruptcy Protection and Reorganization Plan 
As already noted, Arcapita operates across private equity, infrastructure, venture capital and real estate 
businesses, and the bank’s business model involves making investments subsequently placed with 
wealthy clients usually drawn from the GCC states. However, owing to the global financial collapse of 
2008, the bank faced a liquidity risk management crisis, becoming unable to refinance a syndicated 
Murabahah financing of US$ 1.1bn. Therefore, in 2012 Arcapita became the first Arab Gulf firm to file 
in the US seeking  Chapter 11 protection under American bankruptcy laws to protect its assets and 
investments from any legal challenge, thus allowing the bank to continue talks with its lenders (French, 
2012).  It was able to do this due to its presence in the US market. The bank had been unable to reach 
an agreement with its creditors to refinance a US$1.1 billion Islamic (Murabahah) syndicated finance 
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facility due in April 2012, under pressure from hedge funds that were members of the syndicate insistent 
on full repayment. Although some of its creditors were prepared to support the bank, this was not 
effective because certain non-bank creditors (hedge funds) withheld their agreement. Shari’ah 
constraints, in particular the prohibition of the trading of liabilities, further complicated the situation. In 
such circumstances, Arcapita, having sought and obtained protection under Chapter 11 of the US 
bankruptcy code, subsequently sold off most investments to meet its obligations to creditors. According 
to the Arcapita CEO, the firm managed about US$7.4bn of assets, while the reorganisation plan 
represented the most effective way to implement a comprehensive restructuring of Arcapita, in order to 
maximise recoveries to creditors and other stakeholders.   
While the bank’s voluntary case under Chapter 11 aimed to protect its assets and develop plans to 
refinance the US$1.1bn debt, in the context of the negative impact of the global credit and Eurozone 
crises, its ability to secure funds, to dispose of investments and to extend the facility was restricted.  
However, under Chapter 11 provisions, Arcapita continued operations and managed its properties under 
the direction and control of its board and management. The reorganisation plan was submitted to 
creditors to vote on; and, subject to the US court for confirmation, while proceeds from asset sales were 
repaid to creditors, who were also given equity in companies holding Arcapita’s assets.   
Alternatives to Chapter 11 protection involved liquidation, which would have required the entire sale 
of Arcapita’s assets, preventing Arcapita from securing new investments. This would have meant the 
liquidation of assets worth US$7.4bn under its management, including real estate, infrastructure, 
venture capital and private equity stakes in companies, ranging from an insulation maker in 
Massachusetts to a French logistics firm. Arcapita had stated its determination to work with advisors 
during the exclusivity period if this was granted by the court. The reorganisation plan envisioned a new 
$550 million Sukuk (Islamic security) to be issued to the unsecured creditors. The Sukuk would come 
with a 12% annual profit rate. They would be unsecured and perpetual, meaning they would have no 
fixed redemption date.  Arcapita also proposed to secure a $185 million Shari’ah-compliant exit facility 
to provide working capital and payback financing used to tide it over during the bankruptcy process 
(Fitch, 2013). Although the reorganisation plan was opposed by some creditors, the court finally 
approved Arcapita’s reorganisation plan under Chapter 11 protection. Arcapita, thereby, avoided 
liquidation and has remained in business to date. Therefore, the question raised here is: what are the 
circumstances that led Arcapita to file for bankruptcy protection, which requires an examination of the 
CG and RM issues arising from this case study. 
5. Challenges and Failure of Risk Management 
Arcapita was initially successful in constructing a business model that, at the time, took advantage of 
the benefits of the global business environment. With respect to the BOD’s attitude toward risk, it 
ensured that a RM framework was in place that was thought to be effective in the circumstances. The 
Basel III requirements for liquidity RM and stress testing had not yet been developed. Nevertheless, the 
bank faced some challenges posed by globalisation. Different cultures and political systems fused 
together as new challenges. 
According to Bedicks; and Arruda (2005), globalisation and concentration of ownership are primary 
influences on the development of CG; however, certain activities by Arcapita’s management raised 
questions about the company’s ethical judgment, particularly as regards conflicts of interest in the 
conduct of business.  For example, two weeks before the decision was taken to file for Chapter 11 
protection, Arcapita’s BOD agreed to lease back the Lusail property project to Qatar Islamic Bank 
(QIB) for US$200 million.  Even though the son of Qatar’s prime minister (chair of QIB) and member 
of the Arcapita board, did not attend the meeting that approved the sale and leaseback, some governance 
issues around conflict of interest may be raised, and questions surrounding the timing and the necessity 
of the deal that was given to QIB but not to other potential lenders could arise. In this connection, it is 
relevant that Arcapita was faced with a vast amount of debt claims, over and above its US$1.1 billion 
Murabahah liability, before filing for bankruptcy protection. For example, the second-largest creditor 
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to Arcapita, Germany’s Commerzbank, requested to be paid a guarantee of about US$165 million for 
HT Troplast (plastics manufacturer), one of Arcapita’s subsidiaries based in Berlin.  
Another issue with Arcapita’s RM that resulted in Chapter 11 protection concerned various activities 
of non-bank creditors, which raised an ethical issue, regarding how Shari’ah-compliant liabilities are 
traded, as trading of liabilities. This is not Shari’ah-compliant, and the ‘vulture funds’ were not bound 
by Shari’ah rules and principles. According to Arcapita CEO, the reason for reliance on Chapter 11 was 
the precipitous action threatened by hedge funds that had purchased some of Arcapita’s liabilities at a 
discount (so-called ‘vulture funds’) and were seeking to leverage their opposition to a restructuring to 
obtain a buyout at par.  
The potential fragility of Arcapita’s business model can be seen through one of the major failures of 
RM that troubled the bank, namely its strategy for refinancing its liabilities, which involved exposure 
to both market liquidity and funding liquidity risks. Arcapita used to refinance its liabilities by paying 
back a portion of the liability using the cash obtained through disposals of investments and using this 
new facility to refinance the balance of the liability. Thus, Arcapita was exposed to market liquidity 
risk with respect to the disposal, leading to funding (refinancing) liquidity risk when the global market 
crisis slowed down the refinancing process. Hence, the bank found itself obliged to raise US$1.1 billion, 
which it did by entering into a relatively short-term syndicated Murabahah financing agreement with 
more than 50 creditors. It was subsequently unable to repay this liability at maturity, a default that led 
to its filing for Chapter 11 protection.  Furthermore, as a result of the global economic crisis and the 
failure to refinance its debt of US$1.1 billion, Arcapita started to sell off most of its investments such 
as the fast-food chain, Church’s Chicken, to repay their debt (Griffith, 2009, Arnold and Kerr, 2009). 
In addition to the 2008 global financial crisis that affected most industries and banks including Arcapita, 
the slowdown of businesses worldwide, and the hedge funds’ tactics of putting pressure on Arcapita led 
to the bank seeking Chapter 11 protection, the firm faced the specific problems mentioned above, which 
contributed to its financial difficulties. These notably included the maturity mismatch between its assets 
and the $1.1 billion Murabahah payable that was due in March 2012 and which it was unable to 
refinance. In the event, Arcapita was willing to take the reputational risk resulting from filing for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11; this allowed it to realise its investments in an orderly manner. It was thus 
protecting them from the hedge funds which had hoped to acquire them at ‘fire sale’ prices in case of 
default.  
Arcapita’s syndicated Murabahah Islamic financing of US$1.1 billion involved more than 50 creditors. 
At the same time, hedge funds held around 25 per cent of the debt, and their attitude subsequently made 
it impossible to reach a deal to restructure the financing and led to filing under Chapter 11. The decision 
of the CBB to support Arcapita raises additional questions about the prudence of the country’s regulator 
(Kerr, 2012), and may create a precedent placing pressure on the regulator to intervene in the future. 
The CBB was the largest of around 50 unsecured lenders, being owed $255m, and stated that the 
Murabahah facility had been extended to Arcapita. This was in line with CBB policy of directing 
deposits to local banks to support the banking sector in the Kingdom of Bahrain in light of the global 
financial crisis by the end of 2008 (Kerr, 2012). The regulator’s reputation constitutes one of the selling 
points of the country’s financial services sector. The financial support of Arcapita by the CBB arguably 
compromised its independence and impartiality in regulating the sector and was also criticised as an 
imprudent use of state resources (Kerr, 2012).  
Two further reasons have been proposed to explain Arcapita’s inability to reach an agreement with its 
creditors. One of these relates to creditors’ concerns about the political and financial context of the GCC 
countries. It has been suggested that the creditors, especially those in Europe, were concerned about 
political instability in the region at the time of the negotiations. In particular, Bahrain faced escalating 
problems concerning political upheaval, including sustained pro-democracy protests that threatened the 
country’s financial sector and caused foreign bankers and offshore banking assets to exit.  Moreover, 
the past history of other GCC companies in rescheduling their debt and failure to pay such creditors, as 
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with Gulf Financial House which tried to reschedule its debt several times already, created a fear of 
dealing with GCC companies.   
Secondly, but less plausibly, the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, have been cited 
as a possible source of difficulties for Arcapita. While these were probably a reason for the change of 
name from ‘First Islamic’ in 2005, it is doubtful whether the attacks led to difficulties for Arcapita. 
There were some objections at the time to businesses with Muslim ownership, and Caribou Coffee, the 
second-largest speciality chain retailer of premium brewed and roasted whole bean coffee, which had 
been acquired in 2000 by Crescent Capital, one of Arcapita’s subsidiaries, became a target of calls for 
a boycott. However,  it has been noted that the boycott may, in fact, have had minimal growth impact 
on the chain, which nevertheless increased the number of its stores (Paul and Poole, 2006). 
In addition, there were some difficulties related explicitly to restrictions imposed by the need for 
Shari’ah compliance, which aggravated the problems of funding and market liquidity. Arcapita, as an 
Islamic investment bank, faces constraints regarding the availability of Shari’ah-compliant liquid assets 
and LOLR facilities, as well as the lack of a Shari’ah-compliant interbank market, which created a 
scarcity in terms of funding liquidity. Therefore, this affected the growth of the business, as well as 
contributing to difficulties in refinancing its liabilities, which propelled its subsequent bankruptcy. The 
global recession hampered the bank’s ability to obtain liquidity from the capital markets, especially 
Shari’ah-compliant funds. The global recession mainly affected Arcapita’s ability to offload its 
investments at reasonable prices to clients as required by its business model (market liquidity). It also 
resulted in a reduction in asset values, as it negatively impacted the process of placing investments with 
customers.  
Correspondingly, both market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk (aggravated by Shari’ah non-
compliance risk) are major components of Arcapita’s profile that are difficult to manage, given the lack 
of Shari’ah-compliant funding. The bank seeks to manage its investment risks through each stage of the 
investment process, including investment funding, sourcing, and the investment holding period.  Prior 
to funding investment, and regardless of its size, the SSB and the Shari’ah department provide an 
independent assessment of the opportunity to make sure their investment and funding are Shari’ah-
compliant, highlighting key risks before commitment. All Arcapita business lines use a private equity 
risk model to manage their investment portfolio. The RM Committee ensures that Arcapita maintains 
appropriate asset diversification by geography, industry and investment type, and seeks Shari’ah-
compliant funding (Arcapita, 2011).  
Thus, while in theory, Arcapita had solid CG and RM structures, these were insufficient in practice to 
prevent the liquidity crisis into which it fell in the wake of the 2007-8 financial crisis. The business 
model was inherently vulnerable to both funding and market liquidity risk. Stress tests might have 
revealed this vulnerability and led Arcapita to increase its own funds and reduce its reliance on non-
equity funds such as Murabahah, but they were not required at the time.    
As a result, to answer the key question: to what extent are failures in RM the result of inadequate CG?  
In the case of Arcapita, it may be argued that the failure in RM was basically due to a governance (i.e. 
strategic guidance) problem involving the design of the business model. As noted above, the business 
model was potentially unstable as it entailed exposures to both funding and market liquidity risk as well 
as the use of a high degree of leverage (debt/equity ratios of over 200%). Given the business model, 
could Arcapita really have managed these risks much better? For example, the liquidity mismatch 
between the investment assets and the liabilities could have been mitigated by matching more closely 
the maturities of the latter to the likely exit dates of the former, thus reducing the refinancing risk. 
Shari’ah constraints on funding might, however, have made this more difficult. The use of Sukuk for 
bank funding was not developed at the time. On the other hand, the very much lower degree of leverage 
used by Arcapita following its exit from ch. 11 protection suggests that the extent of its reliance on 
leverage in its original business model involved an unnecessary risk, and hence inadequacy in CG. 
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In defence of Arcapita, however, it is worth reiterating that prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis the 
dangers of liquidity risk in banking did not initially receive the emphasis that was subsequently 
provided, for example, by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in its Basel III 
guidelines. In Basel II, the emphasis had been on capital adequacy and credit risk rather than liquidity 
risk. The BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management was issued in September 2008, but 
the more detailed guidelines on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) were not published until January 2013 and October 2014, respectively. The Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) issued its Guiding Principles on Liquidity Risk Management for Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services in March 2012 and its more detailed guidelines on the LCR and 
NSFR in April 2015. Moreover, in addition to the increased concern for liquidity risk management, 
there was a growing emphasis on stress tests. In May 2009, the BCBS published its Principles for Sound 
Stress Testing Practices and Supervision. This was followed by the IFSB’s Guiding Principles on Stress 
Testing for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services in March 2012. Had the guidance in these 
publications, with the greater awareness of the dangers of liquidity risk and the need for stress testing, 
been available at an earlier stage of Arcapita’s history, its board and senior management might have 
exhibited greater prudence and built more resilience into the business model.   
Thus, awareness of the dangers of liquidity risk was less developed before the crisis and the attention 
given to such dangers in Basel III.  It is said that it is easy to be wise after the event, with the benefit of 
hindsight. The same applies to the need for stress testing, which would probably have revealed the 
problems of the business model. The use of more equity capital and less reliance on borrowing to 
finance acquisitions would have mitigated the liquidity risk. However, it would have diluted the return 
on shareholders’ equity and would effectively have constituted a change to the business model (in fact, 
such a change was indeed made following Arcapita’s emergence from chapter 11 protection in 2013). 
Longer-term non-equity funds for banks in the form of Sukuk, which would have provided the more 
stable funding to match the maturities of Arcapita’s assets, were developed in later years, but were not 
available prior to 2012 when the first issuance of such Sukuk was made by Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank.   
6. Conclusions and Lessons  
We may conclude that more effective oversight and strategic guidance from CG could have led to a 
more prudent strategy, involving a combination of better maturity matching and reduced reliance on 
borrowing, while retaining the essentials of the business model. However, the replacement of financing 
by equity capital would have reduced the returns on equity, thus making the business model less 
attractive for shareholders.  
This paper has used the case of Arcapita to illustrate and analyse the relationship between CG and RM 
in the choice and ongoing evaluation of a firm’s business model. As a Shari'ah-compliant Islamic 
investment bank, Arcapita had a particular vulnerability to liquidity risk, yet its business model in some 
ways aggravated this risk.  
From the descriptions in Arcapita’s annual reports, it would appear that the bank had instituted well-
developed CG and RM systems. Yet these failed in the stressed conditions following the 2007-8 
financial crisis. This implies that Arcapita’s business model was basically fragile, owing to the 
combined exposures to market liquidity and funding liquidity risks, aggravated by the use of a high 
degree of leverage and a concentration of asset risks in the US. Arcapita’s solvency was critically 
dependent on its ability to sell on a significant proportion of its acquisitions in a relatively short time. 
When it was unable to do so, it was faced with the impossibility of plugging the resulting liquidity gap, 
given its inability to refinance its $1.1 billion Murabahah liability.   
Failing to reach a deal with its creditors to refinance a $ 1.1 billion Murabahah liability that was due 
on March 28, 2012, following the global financial crisis, Arcapita was driven to seek Chapter 11 redress 
in the US to protect its assets and investment from any legal challenge.  The business model required a 
ready market liquidity that was not available in the stressed circumstances following the 2007-8 
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financial crisis, in order to exit from its investments and to cover its operating expenses through the 
investment cycle. The same circumstances left the bank unable to overcome the refinancing risk in 
respect of its 1.1 billion US$ Murabahah liability. The combination of exposure to market liquidity risk 
(aggravated by risk concentration) and funding liquidity risk resulted in Arcapita’s insolvency. 
Although Arcapita blamed both the global financial and Eurozone crises for its financial mess and 
inability to refinance its $1.1 billion Murabahah facility, it is clear an internal problem existed and not 
simply an external one. The CG and RM practices of the bank were not robust enough to overcome the 
inherent riskiness of its business model, which was mainly responsible for the failure leading to 
bankruptcy protection proceedings in the US. 
To conclude, that the governance structure of Arcapita was not exactly weak, but in retrospect it was 
clearly not strong enough. Probably the main weakness was the failure to stress-test the business 
model’s vulnerability to liquidity risk, which means that there was a failure of strategic guidance.    
Hence, the alternative solution to the problem facing Arcapita was limited during the immediate 
aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis. For example, could Arcapita have done anything to prevent the 
debts (part of the syndicated Murababah) such as being sold to the hedge funds, which could result in 
acquiring them at ‘fire sale’ prices?. One needs to bear in mind that the options to avoid holding cash 
were few. The use of short-term Murabahah assets with other banks was one option. More recently, 
short-term Sukuk have become available through the International Islamic Liquidity Management 
(IILM) but did not exist at the time.  
However, Arcapita’s main problem was a dual squeeze: funding liquidity difficulties in having to 
refinance a high level of liabilities at a time when it was being squeezed by a lack of market liquidity 
for disposing of its investments, in the adverse conditions following the 2007-8 financial crisis. The 
syndicated Murabahah facility had a relatively short tenor, which meant a significant roll-over risk. 
Holding more liquid assets would not have helped. The answer would have been more stable funding. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, net stable funding ratio treats as ‘stable’ any financing 
with a residual maturity of at least one year, which may not be long enough to refinance a significant 
liability. Islamic finance has become more sophisticated in the last 10 years, with greater use by banks 
of Sukuk for financing. Typically these Sukuk are based on a form of Mudarabah with the Sukuk-
holders claims on the underlying assets being subordinated to those of general creditors, as in the 
issuances of Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and Dubai Islamic bank in 2012 and 2013.      
In the absence of such solutions, to roll-over its existing Murabahah-based financing, Arcapita would 
have to rely on more Murabahah-based financing. But in the credit crunch following the 2007-8 
financial crisis, it became impossible to refinance the US$1.1bn syndicated Murabahah financing. 
However, this is being said with the benefit of hindsight. The paper thus makes the further point that 
the innovations in prudential requirements introduced in Basel III, as regards liquidity RM, leverage 
and stress testing, met needs that were present but not met during the financial crisis of 2007-8 and the 
ensuing economic crisis. Moreover, developments in Islamic forms of non-equity funding, namely 
Sukuk, were not available prior to 2012. Thus, Arcapita’s CG prior to its filing for chapter 11 protection 
displayed weaknesses and lacks that Basel III and subsequent developments were designed to address.  
From this perspective, arguably the main CG weakness of Arcapita was the failure of the Board to 
require the stress-testing of the business model’s vulnerability to liquidity risk, which can be described 
as a failure of strategic guidance. 
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